Debt deflation
Crowd at New York's American Union Bank during a bank run early in the Great Depression.
Irving Fisher argued that the predominant factor leading to the Great Depression was overindebtedness and deflation. Fisher tied loose credit to over-indebtedness, which fueled speculation and asset bubbles. [8] He then outlined 9 factors interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation to create the mechanics of boom to bust. The chain of events proceeded as follows (1) Debt liquidation and distress selling (2) Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off (3) A fall in the level of asset prices (4) A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies (5) A fall in profits (6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment. (7) Pessimism and loss of confidence (8) Hoarding of money (9) A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates.[8]
During the Crash of 1929 proceeding the Great Depression, margin requirements were only 10%. Brokerage firms, in other words, would loan $9 for every $1 an investor had deposited. When the market fell, brokers called in these loans, which could not be paid back. Banks began to fail as debtors defaulted on debt and depositors attempted to withdraw their deposits en masse, triggering multiple bank runs. Government guarantees and Federal Reserve banking regulations to prevent such panics were ineffective or not used. Bank failures led to the loss of billions of dollars in assets.[9] Outstanding debts became heavier, because prices and incomes fell by 20–50% but the debts remained at the same dollar amount. After the panic of 1929, and during the first 10 months of 1930, 744 US banks failed. (In all, 9,000 banks failed during the 1930s). By 1933, depositors had lost $140 billion in deposits.[9]
Bank failures snowballed as desperate bankers called in loans which the borrowers did not have time or money to repay. With future profits looking poor, capital investment and construction slowed or completely ceased. In the face of bad loans and worsening future prospects, the surviving banks became even more conservative in their lending.[9] Banks built up their capital reserves and made fewer loans, which intensified deflationary pressures. A vicious cycle developed and the downward spiral accelerated. This kind of self-aggravating process turned a 1930 recession into a 1933 great depression.
The liquidation of debt could not keep up with the fall of prices which it caused. The mass effect of their stampede to liquidate increased the value of each dollar they owed, relative to the value of their declining asset holdings. The very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debt effectively increased it. Paradoxically, the more the debtors paid, the more they owed.[8]